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INTRODUCTION
Asset forfeiture' is one of the most powerful weapons used by the federal
government to enforce criminal provisions2 The Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act of 1970 ("Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act") rely on
forfeiture of a convicted criminal's property as a means of enforcing the Acts'
substantive provisions.3 Under the terms of both Acts, assets used or acquired in
furtherance of or as a result of the Acts' prohibited activities must be forfeited to
the United States as a penalty upon conviction.4 In addition to providing for the
seizure of crime-related assets, both RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Act authorize the forfeiture of assets unrelated to the crime, called substitute
assets. Such substitute assets can be forfeited when the crime-related assets of a
criminal have been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court or have been
transferred to a third party.5 Both Acts also provide for forfeiture of substitute
assets where forfeitable assets have decreased significantly in value or have been
commingled with property that cannot be easily divided.6
In order to preserve the availability of crime-related assets for later forfeiture,
RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act authorize pretrial restraint of the
crime-related assets through the Acts' substantially identical provisions for pre-
indictment or post-indictment restraint.7 While both Acts clearly authorize pretrial
1. See United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193, 195 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1978)
(defining forfeiture as "divestiture without compensation of property used in a manner contrary to the laws of
the sovereign").
2. See Bruce A. Baird & Carolyn P. Vinson, RICO Pretrial Restraints and Due Process: The Lessons
of Princeton/Newport, 65 NOTRe DAME L. REV. 1009, 1012-13 (1990) (describing forfeiture under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970 ("Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act") as a "powerful remedy" that fights organized
crime by "removing the leaders of organized crime from their sources of economic power and eliminating the
profitability of crime"); see also 115 CONG. REC. 9566 (1969) (statement of Senator McClellan) (stating that
the forfeiture provisions of RICO could be a powerful weapon which could effectively remove the organized
crime element from a particular field of activity, as well as remove the illegal profit potential which made
certain fields too attractive).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988) (providing for forfeiture of property under RICO); 21 U.S.C. § 853
(1988) (providing for forfeiture of property under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1)-(2) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(l)-(3) (1988); see infra notes 78-82 and
accompanying text (discussing the types of assets forfeitable under RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Act).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (1988); see infra notes 83-85 and accompanying
text (discussing substitute asset forfeiture).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (1988); see infra notes 83-85 and accompanying
text (discussing substitute asset forfeiture).
7. See United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 362 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (observing that the
provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 853 are "substantially identical" to the forfeiture provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1963 and
that the legislative history of 21 U.S.C. § 853 closely parallels that of 18 U.S.C. § 1963); infra notes 86-101
and accompanying text (describing the requirements and procedure for obtaining pretrial asset restraints under
RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act); see also S. REP. No. 98-225, Pub. L. 98-473, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 198, 213, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3381, 3397 (reflecting congressional intent that the forfeiture
provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 853 closely parallel those of 18 U.S.C. § 1963). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)-
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restraint of crime-related assets and post-trial forfeiture of substitute assets, it is
unclear whether, under either Act, substitute assets may be restrained prior to
trial. Currently, a split of authority exists among the federal appellate courts
regarding whether substitute assets may be restrained prior to trial under RICO
and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act: While the Second and Fourth Circuits
have read RICO's substitute asset forfeiture provisions in harmony with the Act's
pretrial restraint provisions to authorize restraint of substitute assets, the Third,
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have refused to give such a reading to either Act.8
The issue of pretrial substitute asset restraint is important to the prosecutor
and criminal defendant alike. The prosecutor, representing the Government's
interest in preserving sufficient assets for later forfeiture, hopes to obtain a
pretrial restraint of substitute assets where the crime-related assets cannot be
located prior to trial.9 Pretrial restraint of substitute assets also raises important
concerns for the criminal defendant, since the effects of restraint may be to freeze
the defendant's only source of funds for attorney's fees and living expenses, and
to deny a presumption of innocence to which the defendant is entitled. °
Moreover, such adverse effects may give the Government bargaining power
against the defendant from the initial proceedings through trial, with the powerful
threat of control over the quality of the defendant's legal defense and lifestyle,
and over the defendant's presumption of innocence."
(2) (1988) (authorizing the court to enter a restraining order or injunction or to take any other rction to preserve
the availability of property for forfeiture under RICO) with 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)-(2) (1988) (authorizing the
court to enter a restraining order or injunction or to take any other action to preserve the availability of property
for forfeiture under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act). Courts considering the Acts' respective forfeiture
provisions have noted their similarity.
8. Compare United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 1988) and In re Assets of Billman,
915 F.2d 916, 921 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 952 (1991) (holding that the district court has the
authority under RICO to restrain substitute assets prior to trial) with United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498, 502
(5th Cir. 1993) and In re Assets of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1362 (3d Cir. 1993) and Ripinsky, 20 F.3d at 365
(holding that the pretrial restraint provisions of RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act do not authorize
pretrial restraint of substitute assets). The cases allowing and prohibiting pretrial restraint of substitute assets
under RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act are discussed in notes 106-207 and accompanying text,
infra. See generally Cris Carmody, Circuit Court Thaws Pretrial Freeze on Assets: A Split Develops over
Pretrial Restraint of Substitute Assets, NAT'LLJ., May 31, 1993, at 10 (discussing the conflict between the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits on the issue of pretrial restraint of substitute assets).
9. See Regan, 858 F.2d at 119 (stating that the purpose of the court's authority to enter restraining
orders pursuant to RICO's forfeiture provisions is to preserve the availability of forfeitable assets until the end
of the trial); see also Billman, 915 F.2d at 921 (extending the rationale used to justify pretrial restraint of crime-
related assets to the pretrial restraint of substitute assets).
10. See Floyd, 992 F.2d at 499 (recounting the district court's denial of the defendant's request that he
be allowed to use certain assets for living expenses and attorney's fees after the court had determined that the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act authorized pretrial restraint of the defendant's substitute assets); Stephen J.
Adler, Are RICO Seizures a Violation of Rights, as Critics Contend? WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 1989, at Al
(reporting that opponents of RICO have argued that seizing assets prior to trial deprives a criminal defendant
of the presumption of innocence).
11. See Adler, supra note 10, at A6 (quoting defense lawyer and law professor Alan Dershowitz as
saying that in practice, RICO is used to coerce defendants into one-sided plea bargains).
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This Comment examines the subject of pretrial restraint of substitute assets
under RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act. Part I reviews the relevant
legal background of forfeiture and pretrial restraint of assets under both Acts.!2
Part II discusses the conflicting court decisions addressing the issue of pretrial
restraint of substitute assets under the Acts' forfeiture provisions.' Finally, Part
III explores the arguments for and against pretrial restraint of substitute assets,
and resolves that substitute assets should not be restrained pretrial under RICO
or the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act because such restraint is not authorized
by the clear language of the Acts' provisions and presents concerns over the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
the Sixth Amendment's protection of the right to counsel of choice."
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The powerful criminal forfeiture provisions and their accompanying pretrial
asset restraint remedies available under RICO and the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Act are relatively new in the Government's arsenal of weapons in criminal
prosecutions.'5 An overview of the Acts' background demonstrates that the
combination of their broad applicability and the severe nature of the criminal
forfeiture and pretrial asset restraint remedies make RICO and the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Act extremely powerful tools in the hands of the Government.6
When the issue of pretrial restraint of substitute assets is considered with an
historically enlightened view of the nature and extent of the Government's.
existing power in forfeiture and pretrial restraint provisions of these Acts, it
becomes clear that the exercise of such restraint would be a severe extension of
the Government's existing power in criminal prosecutions.
7
12. See infra notes 15-105 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 106-207 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 208-241 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text (discussing the historical aversion to, and recent
advent of, criminal forfeiture as a punishment in the United States).
16. See infra notes 25-47 and accompanying text (discussing the broad applicability of RICO and the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act); infra notes 69-85 and accompanying text (discussing criminal forfeiture and
pretrial asset restraint under RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act).
17. See infra notes 61-103 and accompanying text (discussing the history and nature of criminal
forfeiture and pretrial asset restraint under RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 26
A. The Origins and Purposes of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970
1. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
RICO was enacted by Congress in 1970 to provide better means for the
federal government to fight organized crime, through the Act's broad
applicability to defendants engaged in a wide range of activities and through its
powerful remedial provisions, including forfeiture of assets. 8 RICO was intended
to address a perceived shift in organized crime involvement, from activities such
as gambling and prostitution, to activities disguised as legitimate business, such
as investment of concealed profits acquired illegally, extortion, and even money-
lending in exchange for control of a corporation's board of directors. 9 The Act
was designed specifically to remove organized crime from legitimate organi-
zations and to prevent the return of organized crime, where possible, through the
forfeiture of assets acquired illegally 2" The forfeiture provisions of RICO were
formulated essentially to strike at the economic foundations of criminal
enterprises.2 '
2. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970
As with as organized crime was perceived as a growing problem in 1970,
drug abuse was considered an ever increasing occurrence.2 Enacted at the same
time as RICO, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act was intended to combat the
18. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073
(explaining the Act's purpose as seeking to eradicate organized crime by (1) providing better tools to gather
evidence; (2) adding prohibitions; (3) enhancing sanctions; and (4) offering further remedies); see also Russello
v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983) (stating that RICO was intended by Congress to provide "new
weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots"); Robert K.
Rasmussen, Introductory Remarks and a Comment on Civil RICO's Remedial Provisions, 43 VAND. L. REV.
623, 624 (1990) (describing RICO's purpose as the eradication of organized crime in legitimate business). But
see HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,248 (1989) (noting that although Congress enacted
RICO to concentrate on organized crime, it chose to create a general statute that was not so limited in scope);
Adler, supra note 10, at A6 (pointing out that some commentators believe that zealous prosecutors have used
RICO in a coercive manner and against crimes not contemplated by Congress, instead of using RICO in
accordance with its intended purpose).
19. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSnCE, TASK FORCE REPORT.
ORcGA EDCRIME, ANNOTATIONS AND CONSULTANS' PAPERS 2-5 (1967) [hereinafter REPORTON ORGANIZED
CRIME]; Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 624; see 115 CONG. REC. 9566 (1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan)
(stating that criminals use legitimate organizations to further their crimes and that such use has the adverse
effect of corrupting others).
20. 116 CONG. REc. 591 (1970).
21. Id; see REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 19, at 114-26 (describing the economic
motivation behind organized crime and the relation of organized crime to enforcement).
22. H.R. REP. No. 1444,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566,4567.
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rising problem of drug abuse through prevention and rehabilitation for drug users,
and through more effective law enforcement and penalties against drug offenses? 3
The enactment of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act gave the Government the
same powerful tool of forfeiture to combat drug crimes that RICO allowed in the
fight against organized crime.2
B. The Scope of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
1. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
RICO prohibits investing illegal proceeds in a legitimate business, acquiring
an interest in a legitimate business through a pattern of racketeering activity,
participating in or conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity, or conspiring to commit any of the foregoing actions.
Although RICO's authority is derived from the commerce power of Congress, a
motive of economic purpose is not necessary for an enterprise to be prosecuted,
since RICO applies to enterprises engaged in activities that merely affect
commerce, as well as to enterprises actually engaged in commerce.
26
The Act's broad definition of "racketeering activity" includes activities that
can be classified into five general categories. The first encompasses certain
crimes under state law punishable by more than one year 7 The second is
comprised of a wide variety of federal crimes, including mail fraud and wire
fraud . 8 The third covers crimes relating to unions and labor organizations.29 The
23. Id.
24. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988) (providing for criminal forfeiture of property upon conviction under
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988 & Supp 111990) (providing for criminal
forfeiture of property upon conviction under RICO).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
26. See id. § 1962(a)-(c) (1988) (conditioning RICO's applicability on either (1) an enterprise's
engagement in interstate commerce; or (2) the effect of an enterprise's activities on interstate commerce);
National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 804-06 (1994) (emphasizing that RICO requires
merely that an enterprise affect commerce in the sense that it has a detrimental influence thereon, and holding
that a motive of economic purpose is not required for a RICO violation); see also U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8
(providing that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce among the states).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A) (Supp. H 1991). Crimes in this category include any act or threat involving
murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, and dealing in
narcotics or dangerous drugs. Id.
28. See id. § 1341 (Supp. 111991) (describing mail fraud as a scheme to defraud which involves a
mailing in furtherance of the scheme); id. § 1343 (Supp. 111991) (describing wire fraud as a scheme to defraud
which involves the interstate use of wire communications in furtherance of the scheme); see also Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,504 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that RICO pushes the wire
and mail fraud statutes to their extreme limits); Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 626 (reporting that the broad
definitions of mail fraud and wire fraud have led to an increase in RICO suits). See generally Ellen S. Podgor,
Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43 S.C. L. REV. 223, 263-67 (1992) (discussing mail fraud as a predicate act for
RICO).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(C) (Supp. 111991).
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fourth is composed of drug offenses and securities fraud?) The fifth includes
money laundering'offenses."'
RICO defines a "pattern" of racketeering activity as requiring at least two acts
of racketeering activity within a ten-year period?2 Such racketeering acts are
commonly known as "predicate acts" to a RICO cause of action.33 Because RICO
provides no specific guidance as to what constitutes a "pattern," the United States
Supreme Court, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,34 gave some substance to its
definition. While RICO requires at least two predicate acts, those two acts alone
may be insufficient to constitute a RICO violation if they were sporadic,
according to Sedima.35
"Enterprise" is defined by the Act to include an individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or any group of individuals which, although not a legal
entity, has members that are associated in fact?6 Such a broad definition of
enterprise makes the statute a double-edged sword. It allows RICO to be applied
to the almost infinite gamut of arrangements that organized criminals may devise;
however, it can also be applied to legitimate businesses, adversely affecting
unsuspecting third parties
3 7
Because of its broad definitions of "pattern" and "racketeering activity,"
RICO has been used by the Government to prosecute a wide variety of offenses
30. Id. § 1961(1)(D) (Supp. 11 1991). Drug crimes punishable under RICO include drug crimes
punishable under any law of the United States. Id. Securities fraud is not defined in RICO. Courts have
required that a valid securities fraud claim exist under applicable state or federal law in order to serve as a
RICO predicate offense. See, e.g., In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton & Co., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1424-26 (E.D.
Pa. 1984).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(I)(E) (Supp. 111991).
32. Id. § 1961(5) (1988). The two required acts of racketeering activity need not havc previously been
charged. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430,441 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). The
two racketeering acts may be federal violations, state violations, or a combination of the two. I DAVID R.
MCCORMACK,RACKETmmRINFLUENCEDCORRUPTORGANZA'nONS § 5.18(1989). See United States v. Starnes,
644 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding that two offenses arising from a single transaction or activity may
satisfy the requirement of two racketeering acts if they can ie prosecuted as individual crimes), cert, denied,
454 U.S. 826 (1981).
33. Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 626.
34. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
35. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988); see Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 804 (explaining that "enterprise" as used
to determine the Act's applicability in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) is defined as the medium through which the pattern
of racketeering activity is committed, rather than as the victim of that activity); United States v. Benny, 786
F.2d 1410, 1416 (9th Cir. 1986) (deciding that a sole proprietorship is an enterprise within the meaning of
RICO, where the defendant's sole proprietorship had several employees who were also defendants in the
action); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190-91 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding that a
corporate division can be an enterprise under RICO); United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 986 (1 1th Cir.
1982) (holding that a corporation can be both enterprise and defendant for purposes of RICO); see also United
States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 997-98 (6th Cir. 1982) (determining that the office of Governor for the
State of Tennessee is an enterprise for purposes of RICO); Parness, 503 F.2d at 439-40 (concluding that the
term "enterprise" includes a foreign corporation, to the extent that the corporation's operations affect interstate
commerce).
37. See Graeme W. Bush, The Impact of RICO Forfeiture on Legitimate Business, 65 NoTE DAMn L.
REV. 996, 998-99 (1990) (criticizing the enterprise concept of RICO for its potential adverse effects on
legitimate businesses).
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that extend far beyond what has traditionally been considered organized crime.38
Since the Act's definitions of "enterprise" and "racketeering activity" do not
require a motive of economic purpose, the permissible scope of RICO has even
been held to extend to ideologically motivated anti-abortion groups and anti-
pornography groups in their efforts to hold organized demonstrations 9 Thus,
many commentators have criticized RICO for being overly broad or inapprop-
riately extended beyond its proper or intended scope of combatting organized
crime, thereby potentially infringing on important civil rights, such as the right
to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.4
2. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevehtion and Control Act of
1970
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act provides for civil and criminal for-
feiture against any person convicted of a violation of substantive drug crime pro-
visions or against any person who is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise
in violation of the Act's substantive provisions.' Possible predicate offenses
under the statute are too numerous to discuss fully in this Comment, but include
'the manufacture, distribution, or possession (with intent to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense) of a controlled substance.42
Like RICO, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act is extremely broad in scope.
In addition to its applicability to numerous drug-related crimes, the range of
offenses to which the Act's forfeiture provisions apply reaches further with the
incorporation of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act's forfeiture provisions into
38. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 248 (acknowledging that although Congress enacted RICO to concentrate
on organized crime, it chose to create a general statute that was not so limited in scope); Adler, supra note 10,
at A6 (stating that some commentators believe that zealous prosecutors have used RICO in a coercive manner
and against crimes not contemplated by Congress, instead of using RICO in accordance with its intended
purpose). The largest percentage of RICO prosecutions has targeted corrupt government officials (28%),
followed by crimes involving narcotics (27%), private sector fraud (13%), labor racketeering (7%), government
procurement fraud (6%), gambling (5%), and securities fraud (1%). Id.
39. See Scheidler, 114 S. CL at 806 (holding that health care clinics could bring a RICO action against
a coalition of anti-abortion groups that had allegedly conspired, through a pattern of racketeering activity, to
shut down abortion clinics); Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. American Fain. Ass'n of Fla., Inc. No. 89-2526 (D. Fla.,
filed Nov. 14, 1989) (charging the American Family Association with extortion violations for threatening to
publicly label magazines published by Penthouse as obscene).
40. Antonio J. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REv. 805, 821-24 (1990); see id.
(criticizing the application of RICO to ideological disputes such as those concerning abortion and pornography,
as violative of the First Amendment); Adler, supra note 10, at A6 (discussing the views of some commentators
that zealous prosecutors have used RICO outside its intended scope); see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. I
(guaranteeing the right to freedom of speech); Marcia Chambers, Sua Sponte, NAT'LLJ., Feb. 10, 1992, at 15
(lamenting the extension of RICO to the prosecution of the Princeton/Newport defendants, discussed infra in
notes 110-129 and accompanying text).
41. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(3) (1988) (providing for criminal forfeiture upon conviction); id. § 848
(1988) (providing for civil forfeiture).
42. Id. §§ 841-848 (1988).
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the General Criminal Forfeiture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 982.43 Section 982 allows
forfeiture for crimes prohibited by many federal statutes." As a result, a person
accused or convicted of such offenses as altering vehicle identification numbers,
importing or exporting stolen motor vehicles, armed robbery of automobiles, and
possession or transportation of stolen vehicles in interstate commerce is subject
to the forfeiture provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act through the
General Criminal Forfeiture Statute.45
Much of the power of RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act as
prosecutors' weapons can be attributed to the Acts' broad applicability to
defendants in a wide array of circumstances4 The true power of RICO and the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act consists of more than the mere fact that a cause
of action can be formulated against a defendant. Rather, because of these Acts'
broad applicability, the defendants against whom the Acts apply are potentially
subjected to the entire range of penalties authorized under their provisions
4 7
C. Penalties Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act provide for civil and criminal
penalties for their violation. RICO's civil remedies are modeled after federal
antitrust laws.48 These remedies include treble damages and recovery of
attorney's fees for any person injured as a result of a RICO violation.49 A civil
43. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1)(A) (Supp. II 1991) (providing that the court must order forfeiture of
assets pursuant to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act, where the defendant has committed certain enumerated
crimes); see also Floyd, 992 F.2d at 499 (indicating that at the district court level, the United States sought a
restraining order pursuant to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act as incorporated in 18 U.S.C. § 982).
44. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. App. § 2B 1.1 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 982 in sentencing guidelines for larceny,
embezzlement, and other forms of theft); 18 U.S.C. App. § 2B4.1 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 932 in sentencing
guidelines for commercial bribery); 18 U.S.C. App. § 2F1. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 982 in sentencing
guidelines for offenses involving fraud and deceit, including forgery and counterfeiting).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 111991); see Floyd, 992 F.2d at 498 (tracing the Government's
ability to seek pretrial restraint through the Government's reliance on the General Criminal Forfeiture Statute
for numerous offenses under an array of federal criminal statutes); see also Ripinsky, 20 F.3d at 361 (observing
that the defendant was subject to the forfeiture and pretrial restraint provisions of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Act because of his indictment for money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957, which authorizes
the Government to seize assets under the General Criminal Forfeiture Statute).
46. See supra notes 25-45 and accompanying text (discussing the broad applicability of RICO and the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act).
47. See infra notes 48-85 and accompanying text (discussing penalties under RICO and the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act).
48. Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 627.
49. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988) (providing for treble damages and attorney's fees for any
person injured in his business or property as a result of a RICO violation) with 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1988 & Supp.
H) (providing for recovery of treble damages, cost of the lawsuit, and reasonable attorney's fees to any person
who has been injured in his business or property through violation of antitrust laws).
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RICO action may be brought by a private party, the U.S. Attorney General, and,
in certain circumstances, state agencies, counties, or cities.o
As criminal penalties for their violation, RICO and the Comprehensive Drug'
Abuse Act provide for fines of up to $25,000, imprisonment for up to twenty
years (or for life, if the violation is a crime punishable by life imprisonment), and
forfeiture of assets.5' Forfeiture of assets acquired or maintained illegally is a
mandatory punishment under RICO.52 Asset forfeiture is mandatory under the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act as well, where the assets were derived from or
used in connection with a crime that violates the Act's provisions.53 The drastic
remedy of mandatory forfeiture as a punishment for crime is a relatively new
practice in the United States, where it had been restrained for much of the
nation's legal history.
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1988) (providing that the U.S. Attorney General is authorized to institute
civil proceedings for a RICO violation); id. § 1964(c) (1988) (providing that any person injured by a RICO
violation may sue in federal court and may recover treble damages and attorney's fees); Alcorn County v. U.S.
Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th Cir. 1984) (allowing a county to maintain an action to
recover sums paid for supplies billed to it by a supplier who allegedly had bribed a county employee to falsify
records for purchase); City of New York v. Joseph L. Balkan, Inc., 656 F. Supp 536,542-43 (E.D. N.Y. 1987)
(holding that the city had standing to sue for treble damages under RICO where the defendant allegedly had
evaded city regulations by bribing inspectors).
51. 18 U.S.C. §1963(a) (1988 & Supp. 111991); see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-848 (1988 & Supp. I 1991)
(providing for fines or imprisonment as a penalty under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act); id. § 853(a)
(1988) (providing for forfeiture of property as punishment for a criminal violation under the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Act); see also United States v. Marrone, 746 F.2d 957, 959 (3d Cir. 1984) (allowing consecutive
sentences for violation of one of the substantive RICO sections and for conspiring to violate another); United
States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 1980) (sustaining the jury's special verdict- finding'that
defendant's proprietary interests in two businesses were forfeitable where the defendant had placed payoff
money into bank accounts belonging to those businesses); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 570-71 (9th
Cir. 1979) (concluding that consecutive sentences may be imposed for a RICO violation and for the predicate
offense on which the RICO violation is based).
52. See United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985)
and United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir. 1982) (insisting that if the jury finds that the defendant's
assets were used in violation of RICO, the court is required to enter an order to forfeit the assets), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 959 (1983).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988).
54. See Michael P. A. Cohen, Note, The Constitutional Infirmity of RICO Forfeiture, 46 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. (1989) 937, 939-44 (describing the longstanding historical resistance to criminal forfeiture in the
United States prior to the enactment of RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act); infra notes 55-68 and
accompanying text (discussing the history of criminal forfeiture).
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1. An Historical Perspective of Asset Forfeiture as a Criminal Penalty
Prior to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970
Two types of forfeiture existed under early English common law: in rem and
in personam.55 A forfeiture action in rem was an action directly against the
property to be forfeited, rather than against the individual defendant.56 In an in
rem forfeiture action, the court's jurisdiction was over the property to be forfeited
because of its connection with wrongdoing, regardless of the guilt or innocence
of the criminal defendant.5 7
In rem forfeiture is the traditional type of forfeiture used in the United States,
where it has been applied in civil actions to allow the seizure of property involved
in prohibited activity.58 RICO and Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act violations
sometimes give rise to in rem forfeitures, since the unlawful use of property under
either Act may satisfy the requirements for civil forfeiture of property involved
in narcotics violations.59 The importance of the connection of the property to the
alleged wrongdoing prevails in the United States today, thus accounting for the
requirement that in in rem actions, the Government must prove that each item to
be seized was involved in furtherance of the crime.6
As a punishment for crime, a second type of forfeiture was used under early
English common law: A conviction for felony or treason required the criminal to
55. William W. Taylor III, The Problem of Proportionality in RICO Forfeitures, 65 NOTRE DAIS L.
RaE. 885, 885 (1990). In rem literally means "against the thing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 793 (6th ed.
1990). In personam literally means "against the person." Id. at 791. See infra notes 56-68 and accompanying
text (discussing the characteristics of in rem and in personam forfeiture).
56. Taylor, supra note 55, at 885; see Karla R. Spaulding, "Hit Them Where It Hurts:" RICO Criminal
Forfeitures and White Collar Crime, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 197, 198-99 (1989) (tracing the origin
of in rem forfeiture to the English practice of deodand, which required forfeiture to the Crown of any chattel
that caused the death of "any reasonable creature").
57. See United States v. Cargo of the Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 233 (1844) (treating the vessel
used in the crime as the offender, without regard to the owner's character or actions); see also Irving A. Pianin,
Note, Criminal Forfeiture: Attacking the Economic Dimension of Organized Narcotics Trafficking, 32 AM.
U.L REV. 227, 233-34 (1982) (describing in rem forfeiture and stating that the Government may bring a civil
suit seeking forfeiture of the property if the owner is acquitted on the criminal charge).
58. Spaulding, supra note 56, at 199; see The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1827) (allowing forfeiture
on the basis of the property's connection with the crime). But see Mark A. Jankowski, Note, Tempering the
Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to Civil Forfeiture in Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. REV. 165,
174-75 (1990) (criticizing application of in rem forfeiture in the United States for having produced harsh
results, mainly because of harm to the property's owners not at fault for the crime).
59. See Pianin, supra note 57, at 233 (describing in rem forfeiture and stating that the Government may
bring a separate civil suit seeking forfeiture of the property, if the owner is acquitted on the criminal charge);
see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. 1I 1991) (providing for civil forfeiture of property used in drug
violations).
60. See, e.g., United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, Four Door Sedan, 711 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th
Cir. 1983) (holding that the telephone in a forfeited automobile was not forfeitable, because the Government
had failed to produce evidence that the telephone had been used in furtherance of the crime).
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forfeit all property, real and personal.6t Such forfeiture was inpersonam, because
it was based on the guilt of the convicted felon, rather than upon the use of the
property in the commission of the crime.62 Because it was abused by the English
Crown, forfeiture was expressly restricted in the Magna Carta and in the English
Bill of Rights.63 Criminal in personam forfeiture was rejected altogether by the
Framers of the United States Constitution and by the First Federal Congress. At
least three factors discouraged criminal forfeiture in the United States: (1) The
colonial government wanted to prevent property from being forfeited to England;
(2) most criminals had no significant property to forfeit; and (3) colonial
authorities did not want innocent family members of the criminal to be adversely
affected.65
During the Civil War, in personam forfeiture was authorized by the
Confiscation Act of 1862 to allow the life estates of confederate sympathizers to
be seized by the President.6 During the period between the Civil War and 1970,
however, Congress adhered to the original prohibition of in personam forfeiture. 67
With the enactment of RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act, Congress
reinstituted in personam forfeiture, which represented a significantly broader
application and stronger punitive use of forfeiture than had ever been practiced
in the United States, since it was based on the defendant's guilt rather than upon
the connection of the forfeited property to the alleged wrongdoing.
61. McCoRMACK, supra note 32 at § 5.27.
62. See 8 WiLLmi BLACKsToNE, COMMENTARIES, *299-300 (explaining that in personam forfeiture
was based on the rationale that since all property is derived from society, any member of society who violates
his fundamental social contract by violating society's laws forfeits his right to that property; therefore, the state
is justified in retaking the portion of the property that the felon had been granted by society).
63. See Jed S. Rakoff, Will the Supreme Court Restrain Forfeiture? N.Y. LJ., July 8, 1993, at 3
(attributing anti-forfeiture provisions in the Magna Carta and excessive-fine provisions in the English Bill of
Rights to forfeiture abuses by the English Crown).
64. Cohen, supra note 54, at 939. The Constitution banned corruption of blood (as punishment for
treason) and forfeiture of estate, two of the most severe forms of forfeiture. See U.S. CONsT. art. 3, § 3
(specifying that "[tihe Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of
Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted"); see also
James R. Maxeiner, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last? 62 CORNELL L. REv. 768,
773-74 (1977) (equating corruption of blood with preventing descendants to trace a line of inheritance through
the attainted ancestor). The prohibition of in personam forfeiture was extended to all felonies by the First
Federal Congress in 1790. See Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 112, 117 (prohibiting corruption of
blood or forfeiture of estate).
65. Edward C. Weiner, Crime Must Not Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture in Perspective, 1 N. ILL. L.
REv. 225,231 (1981).
66. Confiscation Act, ch. 195, § 5, 12 Stat. 589, 590 (1862).
67. Spaulding, supra note 56, at 199; Kathleen C. Van Olst, Note, Caplin & Drysdale v. United States
and United States v. Monsanto: Forfeiture of Attorney Fees and Constitutional Rights, 39 CATH. U.L. REV.
269,276 (1989).
68. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969) (referring to the use of criminal forfeiture as
a return to our common law heritage to address the modem problem of organized crime); Alexander v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2766,2778 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (observing that modem forfeiture provisions are
novel for their punitive nature as well as for their unprecedented range of application, which was not known
in the federal system until RICO was enacted in 1970); see also C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 125.1 (2d ed. 1982) (recognizing that in personam criminal penalties were not known in the
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2. Asset Forfeiture as a Criminal Penalty Under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
Forfeiture under RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act differs from
traditional in rem forfeiture in the United States in that it is an action in personam,
directly against the criminal defendant.6 9 Insofar as RICO criminal forfeiture
focuses on the individual defendant, *rather than on the property, it resembles in
personam forfeiture as a criminal punishment under early English common law.70
While both RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act have contained
criminal forfeiture provisions since their inception in 1970, Congress decided to
change them after observing that these Acts were not being used as the powerful
weapons they had been intended to be.7 t Concerned that the Government was not
using RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act to their full potential to
prosecute criminals, Congress passed the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act in
1984.72
The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act amended RICO and the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Act to more clearly authorize the forfeiture of assets obtained
through racketeering or illegal drug activity,73 to render void the pre-conviction
transfer of such assets to certain third parties,74 and to make more readily
available the issuance of pre-trial protective orders to preserve assets for later
federal system until RICO was enacted in 1970).
69. Taylor, supra note 55, at 885.
70. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969) (referring to the use of criminal forfeiture as
a return to common law heritage to address the modem problem of organized crime); MCCORMACK, supra note
32, at § 5.27 (pointing out the focus on the defendant rather than on the property, in both RICO forfeiture and
forfeiture under early English common law); see also supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (discussing
the history and recent revival, through RICO, of in personam forfeiture).
71. See COMPTROtLLER GEN., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING Omce, AssEr Fo'rrutn-E-A SELDOM USED
TOOLIN COMBATNG DRUG TRAFPIKING 9 (1981) (attributing the ineffectiveness of the 1970 RICO forfeiture
provisions to statutory flaws); Kathleen A. Ravotti, Caplin & Drysdale v. United States and United States v.
Monsanto: The War on Drugs Gels a New Recruit, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 269, 298-99 n.9 & 99 n. 11 (1990)
(describing the poor success rate of RICO's forfeiture provisions prior to passage of the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act); see also Baird & Vinson, supra note 2, at 1015 (stating that the amendments to RICO pursuant
to the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act were a result of the government's lack of success in obtaining forfeitures
under the existing forfeiture provisions).
72. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040 (1984) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 & Supp. 111991) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988)); see S. REP. No. 225,98th
Cong. 1st Sess. 191 (1984) (defining the purpose of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act to be the enhanced use
of forfeiture as a tool to enforce the law in fighting the nation's two most serious crime problems of
racketeering and drug trafficking).
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988 & Supp. 111991) (authorizing the forfeiture of: (1) Any interest in,
security of, claim against, or property or contractual right affording a source of influence over an enterprise
associated with a RICO violation; and (2) any property constituting or derived from proceeds obtained from
a RICO violation); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988) (authorizing the forfeiture of assets obtained as a result of or
derived from the proceeds of a Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act violation).
74. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988) (authorizing the forfeiture of crime-related property that is
transferred to a third party, unless the transferee is a bonafide purchaser for value, who at time of purchase had
reasonable cause to believe that the property was not subject to forfeiture).
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forfeiture.75 In addition, the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act added a relation-back
provision, vesting the Government's interest in the property at the time the crime
was committed, instead of upon conviction.?6 The effect of the relation-back
doctrine is to allow the Government to void post-offense transfers of property.7
While RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act call for forfeiture of
criminal proceeds and property used in furtherance of the crime, the in personam
basis for forfeiture under the Acts extends the Government's forfeiture power
greatly. The in personam basis allows forfeiture of property that has only a very
tenuous relationship or no relationship to the crime, since the focus of in
personam forfeiture is on the criminal defendant rather than on the fictitious guilt
of the property.78 Under section 1963(a)(2)(D) of RICO, for example, an asset or
interest will be forfeited if it merely provides a source of influence over any
enterprise in which the defendant was involved in violation of RICO. 9 Thus,
forfeitable interests may include voting rights in a corporation, a contract for
management between the defendant and the enterprise, or the right to hold office
in a political organization or a union.80 In addition, in personam forfeiture allows
the Government to obtain the proceeds from illegally obtained property, which
would not be reachable through in rem forfeiture. 81 The combination of the in
personam basis of criminal forfeiture under these Acts and the Acts' broad
applicability creates enormous potential for adverse effects on unsuspecting third
parties who share property interests with criminal defendants.
82
75. See infra notes 86-105 and accompanying text (describing the issuance procedures for obtaining
pretrial restraint of assets under both Acts).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988); see Jankowski, supra note 58, at 177
(criticizing the relation-back doctrine as it presently exists under civil forfeiture provisions in federal drug
statutes, because of its inadequate protection of innocent owners). The relation-back provision has been held
by the United States Supreme Court to allow the Government to recover money RICO defendants have paid
to their attorneys. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 (1989).
77. Craig W. Palm, RICO Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment: When Is Everything Too Much?, 53
U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1991).
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 111991) (requiring forfeiture of any interest acquired
in violation of activities prohibited by RICO); id. § 1963(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. 111991) (requiring forfeiture
of any property constituting or derived from proceeds obtained from any activity prohibited by RICO); 21
U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988) (providing for forfeiture of property as punishment for a criminal violation under the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act); see also Taylor, supra note 55 at 885 (criticizing RICO's broad applicability
to property not necessarily obtained as a direct result of criminal conduct, as violating the principle that the
punishment be proportional to the crime); supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (discussing the history
and nature of in personam forfeiture as a criminal punishment).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2)(D) (1988 & Supp. 111991).
80. MCCORMACK, supra note 32, at § 5.31.
81. Elizabeth A. Skorcz, RICO Forfeiture: Secured Lenders Beware, 37 UCLA L. REv. 1199, 1211
(1990); see Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2778 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (observing that the use of civil in rem
forfeiture ordinarily is ordinarily limited to unlawfully used property).
82. See Skorcz, supra note 81, at 1206-12 (discussing the dangers posed by in personam forfeiture to
third parties who have made loans to defendants with property subject to forfeiture under RICO or the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act); see also Bush, supra note 37, at 1000 (pointing out that the broad enterprise
concept of RICO may allow forfeiture of the entire enterprise, limited only by the requirement that the
forfeiture be proportional to the crime); supra notes 25-47 and accompanying text (discussing the broad
applicability of RICO due to its broad concept of "enterprise"); supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text
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The shift of punitive forfeiture from in rem to in personam has allowed
Congress to extend the reach of forfeiture beyond assets bearing a loose
connection to the crime, thus including property in no way connected with the
crime through the forfeiture of substitute assets under RICO and the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act.' The forfeiture of assets unrelated to the crime
is only possible when the basis for the forfeiture is the defendant's guilt, since in
rem forfeiture requires a showing that the property was used in connection with
the prohibited activityr Although the taking of untainted property to punish
criminals was abhorred by the Framers of the Constitution and has been criticized
recently, forfeiture of substitute assets pursuant to RICO and the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Act has been allowed by courts thus far. 5
3. Pretrial Restraint of Assets Under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970
RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act provide a procedural frame-
work for restraining assets prior to trial." A federal court may enter a restraining
order or an injunction, require the execution of a bond, or take any other action
to preserve the availability of crime-related assets.87 Restraint of assets under
RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act may take place either before or
after indictment.8 While the requirements for post-indictment restraints are much
more lenient, a pre-indictment restraint may be more desirable to a prosecutor,
(discussing the applicability of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act, particularly as extended by the
incorporation of its forfeiture provisions into the general criminal forfeiture statute).
83. See Bilman, 915 F.2d at 920 (justifying the forfeiture of substitute assets under RICO because such
a forfeiture is an inpersonam proceeding against the criminal defendant).
84. See One 1978 Mercedes Benz. Four Door Sedan, 711 F.2d at 1304 (prohibiting forfeiture of
property that was not proven to have been used'in committing the crime); supra notes 56-60 and accompanying
text (discussing in rem forfeiture and the requirement that the property be related to the crime).
85. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (prohibiting forfeiture of estate as a punishment for treason); U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment); United States v. Reed, 924 F.2d 1014, 1017
(I1th Cir. 1991) (finding that forfeiture of defendant's substitute assets was permissible under 18 U.S.C. §
1963(m), where defendant had sold the crime-related property to a bonafide purchaser for value); United States
v. Martenson, 780 F. Supp. 492,495 (N.D. 111. 1991) (holding that defendant's house could be forfeited as a
substitute asset under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m), and that such forfeiture would not violate the ex post facto
provision of the Constitution, notwithstanding the fact that § 1963(m) was enacted after the defendant was
sentenced); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (prohibiting ex post facto laws). But see Taylor, supra note 55 at
891-94 (criticizing forfeiture of untainted assets under RICO as violative of the Constitution's prohibition of
forfeiture of estate, and as constituting cruel and unusual punishment).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)-(2) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(3)(l)-(2) (1988).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(d)(1) (1988).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(I)-(2) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(d)(l)-(2) (1988); see infra notes 86-101 and
accompanying text (discussing the differing requirements and procedures for obtaining a restraint of assets
before and after indictment).
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because it can prevent the defendant from disposing of his property at an early
stage in the proceedings.89
For pre-indictment restraints, prior notice and opportunity for hearing are
required by the Acts unless the Government can demonstrate that probable cause
exists to believe that the property would be subject to forfeiture and that
providing notice would jeopardize the availability of the property.9 In order for
a pre-indictment restraining order to issue, the statute requires that a three-
pronged test be satisfied. First, the Government must show that there is a
substantial probability that it will prevail on the forfeiture issue.' Second, the
Government must show that the property will be unavailable for forfeiture unless
restrained.92 Third, the Government must show that the need to preserve the
availability of the property outweighs the hardship to any party against whom the
restraining order is entered.93 A pre-indictment restraining order is valid under
both Acts for ninety days, unless an indictment issues.
94
Post-indictment restraints are authorized without a hearing under the Acts.95
Federal courts generally allow such post-indictment restraints under the seizure
provisions without requiring a pre-seizure hearing, since the probable cause
determination of the grand jury at the indictment satisfies the procedural require-
ments of a hearing to determine probable cause for restraint.9 Most federal courts
agree, however, that a post-seizure hearing is required where property is
restrained after indictment, in order to assure that a defendant's rights to due pro-
cess under the Fifth Amendment are not violated.97 There is, however, disagree-
ment as to the proper standard for such a hearing.98 In extreme circumstances, the
89. MCCORMACK, supra note 32, at § 5.18.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(B) (1988); id. § 1963(d)(2) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B) (1988); id.
§ 853(e)(2) (1988).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(B)(i); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B)(i) (1988).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(B)(i); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B)(i) (1988).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(B)(ii) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B)(ii) (1988).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(B)(ii) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B)(ii) (1988).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(A) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) (1988); see S. REP. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1984) (rejecting the civil temporary restraining order standard used by some courts for
post-indictment restraining orders under RICO because of the belief that the probable cause requirement for
the issuance of an indictment constitutes grounds for restraint of assets).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Musson, 802 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the probable
cause determination of the grand jury at the indictment is sufficient to authorize post-indictment restraint of
assets under RICO assets without a prior hearing). But see United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1470 (5th
Cir. 1986) (holding that a hearing is required before a post-indictment restraint of assets may issue under the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act); Baird & Vinson, supra note 2, at 1018-23 (criticizing the general practice
of issuing post-indictment asset restraints without a hearing under RICO as violative of the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause).
97. Baird & Vinson, supra note 2, at 1018-23.
98. See Thier, 801 F.2d at 1468 (finding that all restraining orders, including post-indictment restraining
orders under RICO, must comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, and that a
hearing must be held within 10 days of their issuance), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1297-98 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of probable cause before a restraining order can issue), vacated and remanded,
468 U.S. 1206 (1984); United States v. Perholtz, 622 F. Supp. 1253, 1256 (D.C. 1985) (stating that due process
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Government may obtain an ex parte restraining order, and thus escape any
requirement for an immediate hearing, if it can demonstrate that there is probable
cause to believe that the property involved is subject to forfeiture and that pro-
viding notice will jeopardize the availability of property.99 An exparte restraining
order is valid for ten days unless good cause is shown for an extension.1' A
defendant finding his assets restrained prior to trial under RICO or the Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Act may immediately appeal the restraining order, as may
defendants faced with traditional injunctions.'
Although relatively clear standards have been developed regarding the
procedural requirements of pretrial asset restraint, no guidance has been provided
by Congress or the Supreme Court regarding the pretrial restraint of substitute
assets. While the Acts clearly allow forfeiture of substitute assets upon conviction
where crime-related assets are no longer available, neither RICO nor the Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Act expressly authorizes the pretrial restraint of substitute
assets' 0 2 The Federal Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fourth Circuits have
read RICO's substitute asset forfeiture provisions in harmony with that Act's
pretrial restraint provisions to authorize restraint of substitute assets. 3 The Third
and Fifth Circuits, however, have refused to give such a reading to either Act.
t°4
requires that a restraining order be temporary and that the Government give a defendant a hearing within "a
brief amount of time"); Baird & Vinson, supra note 2, at 1018-23 (discussing the various viewpoints regarding
the necessity of a post-seizure hearing where there has been a pretrial restraint of assets under RICO); see also
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (holding that due process of law requires that where there is a
temporary deprivation of property such as that pursuant to a restraining order, there must be notice to the
property owner.) In addition, there must be an opportunity to be heard within a "meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner." Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manso, 380 U.S. 545,552 (1965). But see Musson, 802 F.2d
at 386 (finding that a hearing is required when the Government seeks a restraining order prior to indictment,
but is not necessary following post-indictment restraint).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(2) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(2) (1988).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(2) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(2) (1988).
101. Floyd, 992 F.2d at 500; United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896,
900-01 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Roth, 912 F.2d 1131, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1990); see Ripinsky, 20 F.3d
at 361 (noting that an order restraining assets prior to trial is a preliminary injunction for procedural purposes
and is therefore appealable as such); see also United States v. Kramer, 912 F.2d 1257, 1259 (11 th Cir. 1990)
(observing that restraining orders issued pursuant to RICO have all the characteristics of a traditional injunction
for appellate review purposes).
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1) (1988) (authorizing the pretrial restraint of assets described in §
1963(a)); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (1988) (authorizing restraint of assets described in § 853(a)); see also 18
U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988 & Supp. 111991) (describing assets to be forfeited as being derived from or used in
a RICO violation); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988) (describing assets to be forfeited as bearing a connection to a
drug-related crime under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act).
103. See Regan, 858 F.2d at 117 and Billman, 915 F.2d at 921 (holding that the district court had the
authority to restrain substitute assets under RICO prior to trial); infra notes 106-155 and accompanying text
(discussing the cases permitting pretrial restraint of substitute assets under RICO).
104. See In re Assets of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1362 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the provisions of RICO
authorizing pretrial restraint of assets do not authorize pretrial restraint of substitute assets); Floyd, 992 F.2d
at 502 (holding that the forfeiture provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act do not authorize the
pretrial restraint of substitute assets); infra notes 156-207 and accompanying text (discussing the cases
prohibiting pretrial restraint of substitute assets). See generally Cris Carmody, Circuit Court Thaws Pretrial
Freeze on Assets: A Split Develops over Pretrial Restraint of Substitute Assets, NAT.'L LJ., May 31, 1993, at
10 (exploring the conflict between the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals on the issue of pretrial
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The discussion below highlights the current split among the federal courts of
appeals on whether substitute assets may be restrained prior to trial."~
II. THE CASES
A. Pretrial Restraint of Substitute Assets Allowed
To date, only the Second and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals have allowed
the pretrial restraint of substitute assets under RICO'3 6 In both of the cases
described below, the courts read the pretrial restraint provisions in harmony with
the substitute asset forfeiture provisions of RICO to authorize the restraints! °7
Furthermore, in both cases, each of the courts believed its construction of the Act
to be in conformity with congressional intent."
1. United States v. Regan 3 9
James Sutton Regan was indicted for, inter alia, conspiring to commit
securities fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, and tax fraud, and for creating and main-
taining false books." Regan had allegedly committed these acts in connection
with his involvement in the Princeton/Newport Group, which consisted of a
limited partnership and nineteen associated business ventures engaged in the
arbitrage business."' Regan had been the managing partner in the
Princeton/Newport Group."1
2
restraint of substitute assets); Rakoff, supra note 63, at 3 (discussing the split of authority in the federal
appellate courts on the issue of pretrial restraint of substitute assets).
105. See infra notes 106-207 and accompanying text.
106. Regan, 858 F.2d at 117; Billman, 915 F.2d at 921; see infra notes 109-130 and accompanying text
(describing the Second Circuit's decision to restrain substitute assets prior to trial in United States v. Regan);
infra notes 131-155 and accompanying text (describing the Fourth Circuit's decision to restrain substitute
assets prior to trial in In re Assets of Billman).
107. Regan, 858 F.2d at 120-21; Billman, 915 F.2d at 921; see infra notes 123 and accompanying text
(describing the Second Circuit's harmonized reading of the pretrial restraint and substitute asset forfeiture
provisions of RICO in Regan); infra notes 142-151 and accompanying text (describing the Fourth Circuit's
harmonized reading of the pretrial restraint and substitute forfeiture provisions of RICO in Billman).
108. Regan, 858 F.2d at 119; Billman, 915 F.2d at 921.
109. 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988).
110. Regan, 858 F.2d at 117; see Kurt Eichenwald, 6 Charged with Racketeering in Wall Street Insider
Inquiry, N.Y. Tas, Aug. 5. 1988, at Al (reporting the indictments of Regan and his partners on charges that
they had created illegal tax losses through fraudulent stock transactions); see also James Buchan, Former
Drexel Trader Indicted, FIN. Twms, Aug. 5, 1988, at 117 (describing the indictments of Regan and his partners
as unprecedented in Wall Street History). See generally Steve Coil, Former Drexel Trader, 5 Others Indicted,
WASH. PoST, Aug. 5, 1988, at F1 (detailing the alleged actions for which Regan and his partners were
indicted).
111. Regan, 858 F.2d at 117. Arbitrage is the practice of making a simultaneous purchase in one market
and sale in another of a security to make a profit on the difference in price. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 104
(6th Ed. 1990).
112. Coll, supra note 110, at Fl; see Regan, 858 F.2d at 117 (identifying Regan as a former partner of
the Princeton/Newport Group).
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The indictment sought forfeiture of the proceeds derived from Regan's
unlawful activities." 3 On the day it was issued, the Government moved, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(A), for an order freezing real property and other assets
of the individual defendants that were not connected with the criminal enter-
prise."t 4 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
authorized the requested restraints, which were not appealed! 15 The Government
also sought an order restraining the Princeton/Newport Group's use of its assets,
even though Princeton/Newport was not a defendant in the case."16 The district
court entered an order restraining the Princeton/Newport Group from disposing
of any of its assets (except in the ordinary course of business), unless it first
provided the Government with notice and then obtained permission from the
court."7
The issue addressed by the Second Circuit was whether, under the order
entered by the district court, restraining non-criminally derived assets of an
unindicted third party was appropriate." 8 Before taking up that point, however,
the court first disposed of the issue as to whether assets of a third party can be
restrained under RICO." 9 The court pointed out that where a RICO defendant is
a partner, his interest in the partnership is forfeitable, but the entire partnership
is not subject to forfeiture. 20 In this case, although the defendants' partnership
interests had been restrained, the Government sought further restraint by way of
totally limiting the Princeton/Newport Group's ability to dispose of any of its
assets.12' The court concluded that RICO's pretrial restraint provisions allow
pretrial restraint of assets that will later be subject to forfeiture, even if the
restrained assets are in the hands of a third party.'22 In reaching its conclusion, the
court focused on the language of § 1963(d)(1)(A).'2 It found that the language
113. Regan, 858 F.2d at 117.
114.- Id. at 117-18.
115. Id. at 118.
116. Id. at 117-18.
117. Id. at 118. Four months after its officials were indicted, the Princeton/Newport Group was liquidated
because RICO had driven the Group out of business, according to counsel for the defendants. Adler, supra note
10 at Al; see Jane Rohrer, Note, What Price Investor Confidence? RICO Abuse as Compensable Takings, 66
S. CAL. L. REv. 1675, 1677 (1993) (characterizing the effects of the charges against the Princeton/Newport
partners as irreversible and economically more severe than most criminal convictions).
118. Regan, 858F.2dat 118.
119. Id. at 118-19; see 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(A) (1988) (describing property which may be restrained
prior to trial as property or any enterprise that the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or
participated in the conduct of in violation of RICO, and as any property constituting or derived from proceeds
obtained in violation of RICO).
120. Regan, 858 F.2d at 119 n.2; see United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1347 (5th Cir. 1983)
(holding that where a RICO defendant has a partnership interest, only his interest in the partnership may be
forfeited).
121. Regan, 858 F.2d at 118; see id. at 120-21 (stating that the restraining order's weakness consisted
of its inclusion of all of Princeton/Newport's assets, instead of only those of the individual defendants).
122. Id. at 120-22 (explaining that the restraining order provision does not limit restraining orders to
indicted persons in situations where restraints on defendants are inadequate to protect forfeitable assets),
123. Id. at 119.
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of that section refers to the forfeitable property, rather than the parties,1" and
authorizes the district court to "take any other action" it believes necessary to
ensure that the property will be available for forfeiture.'s 5 Defining the Act's
expressed purpose to be the preservation of forfeitable property pending trial, the
court opined that this purpose cannot be fulfilled if property cannot be restrained
whenever it is in the hands of third parties.t2
The court reasoned that the restraint of Princeton/Newport's assets was
authorized by the RICO restraint provision, since Princeton/Newport had the
opportunity to adversely affect the partnership interests of the defendants!I2
Furthermore, according to the court, the restraining order did not have the effect
of a total restraint on Princeton/Newport's assets, but still allowed the organi-
zation to conduct transactions in the ordinary course of business." The court
warned that before resorting to restraining orders directed against third parties,
other assets of the defendant, seizable under the forfeiture provisions as substitute
assets where crime-related assets are not available, should be restrained 29 The
court reasoned that although § 1963(n)(5) authorized only the forfeiture of
substitute assets to preserve assets of equal value to those related to the crime, the
substitute asset forfeiture provision of RICO suggests that restraining orders
should be used for the same purpose.'3°
2. In re Assets of Billman
13l
In 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held in In
re Assets of Billman that RICO authorizes the pretrial restraint of substitute
assets.32 The Government obtained an indictment against the defendant, Tom J.
Billman, for racketeering, conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, and for
124. Id.; see id. (interpreting the language of that section as Congress' intent to preserve forfeitable
property pending trial).
125. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(A) (1988) (providing that the court may enter a restraining order
or take any other action "to preserve the availability of the property described in subsection(ay'); see also 18
U.S.C. § 196 3 (a) (describing as forfeitable assets, those properties that are connected with the crime).
126. Regan, 858 F.2d at 119-20; see S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 204, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3385, 3387 (clarifying that the only purpose of the restraining order provision is to ensure
that property will continue to be available while trial is pending).
127. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 at 120-21.
128. Id. at 121. But see id. (stating defendants' position to be that such a restraining order would limit
the organization's ability to attract lenders or investors); Adler, supra note 10, at Al (reporting that counsel
for Princeton/Newport attributed the RICO prosecution to the Group going out of business within four months
after its officials were indicted).
129. Regan, 858 F.2d at 121; see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text(discussing forfeiture of
substitute assets under RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act).
130. Subsection (n) of 18 U.S.C. § 1963, as cited by the court in Regan, was redesignated as subsection
(m) in 1988.
131. 915 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 952 (1991).
132. Billman, 915 F.2d at 921.
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other counts of fraud that had led to the failure of a savings and loan.'33 The
indictment charged that the proceeds obtained through racketeering were subject
to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963, subsections (a)(1) and (3).' 34 Billman had
fled the country before the indictment was issued.35 From a location overseas, he
transferred non-tainted funds, which were allegedly subject to post-judgment
forfeiture, to Barbara A. McKinney, a co-conspirator.1
36
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland issued a
temporary restraining order prohibiting McKinney from disposing of the assets. 37
MeKinney later requested a determination from the District Court, as to the
validity of the temporary restraining order.'38 The Government moved for an
injunction to prohibit disposal of the assets prior to forfeiture proceedings. 39 The
court held that the assets that had not been proven to be proceeds of a RICO
offense could not be restrained prior to trial under 18 U.S.C. § 19 63.1
40
Accordingly, the district court denied the Government's motion, and vacated the
temporary restraining order.'
4'
In reversing the decision of the district court, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit read the provision providing for forfeiture of substitute assets in
harmony with the provision providing for pretrial restraint, even though the
pretrial restraint provision refers only to assets related to the crime. 42 The Fourth
133. Id. at 917-18; see Paul Duggan & Paul W. Valentine, S&L Chief Said to Take $50 Million. $8
Million Hidden in Swiss Accounts, WASH. POST. June 28, 1989, at B I (reporting that Billman had overseen a
failed business venture that ruined his savings and loan and received approximately $50 million from the
savings and loan and associated companies, $8 million of which he had hidden in Swiss Banks).
134. Bilman, 915 F.2d at 917-18; see 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 11 1991) (providing that
any interest acquired in violation of RICO shall be forfeited); id. § 1963(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. 11 1991)
(providing that any property consisting of or derived from proceeds obtained in violation or RICO shall be
forfeited).
135. Billman, 915 F.2d at 918; see Bill Atkinson, On the Lam: Tales from Banking's Dark Side, AM.
BANuaR, May 20, 1992, at I (describing Billman's flight as "an elaborate disappearing act" and reporting that
more than three years after he had fled the country, he had managed to elude intensive international searches
conducted by Interpol and United States Marshals); David A. Markiewicz, Crime Show Spotlights Fugitive
S&L Executive, USA TODAY, Feb. 1. 1991, at 2B (noting that the Fox television program America's Most
Wanted, which normally focuses on violent criminals, featured Tom Billman, and reporting that Billman had
last been seen in Spain on his yacht, sipping gin by the side of his Norwegian model girlfriend).
136. Billman, 915 F.2d at 917-18; see Defendant Denied Money, WASH. PoS, June 4, 1991, at C6
(reporting that the United States Supreme Court had, without comment, let stand the [In re Billnan] ruling by
denying Barbara McKinney's appeal, thus allowing prosecutors to keep McKinney from spending the $500,000
she had received from Billman).





142. Id; see 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988 & Supp. 111991) (authorizing forfeiture of assets derived from
or otherwise used in the commission of a RICO violation); id. § 1963(d)(l)(A) (1988) (authorizing the district
court to issue a restraining order or take other action to preserve property forfeitable because of its relation to
the crime); BillUman, 915 F.2d at 918 (emphasizing that where the defendant's crime-related assets have been
placed beyond the district court'sjurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. § (d)(l)(A) is to be read in conjunction with 18 U.S.C.
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Circuit, in part, drew support for reconciling the two provisions from United
States v. Skiles, 43 a decision of the District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia that had construed analogous provisions of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Act to permit the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. 44
In reaching its decision, the court stressed that Congress intended that RICO
be construed liberally to fulfill its remedial purpose. 145 According to the Biliman
court, the remedial purpose of the pretrial restraint provisions was to protect the
defendant's assets for forfeiture in case of conviction. 46 Therefore, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned, a liberal construction to achieve the purpose of preserving assets
required reading the substitute asset forfeiture and pretrial restraint subsections
in harmony.' 47
The Fourth Circuit found additional justification for reading the pretrial
restraint provisions in conjunction with the forfeiture provisions in United States
v. Monsanto,148 a Supreme Court case, in which the Court had read other
provisions of RICO in the same manner in order to discern their meaning. 49 In
Monsanto, however, the Supreme Court addressed whether assets in the hands of
a third party are subject to pretrial restraint when those assets could be traced to
violations of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act, but did not consider the issue
of substitute assets.' 0 Although the Court in Monsanto had not discussed any
issue involving substitute assets, the Biliman court believed that the Supreme
Court's harmonizing of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act's provisions in
Monsanto provided adequate support for the Billman court to do likewise with
regard to pretrial restraint of substitute assets t't
§ 1963 (m) in order to effectuate the remedial purpose of 18 U.S.C. § (d)(1)(A)); see also Regan, 858 F.2d at
119 (describing the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(A) as the preservation of forfeitable assets pending
trial).
143. 715 F. Supp. 1567 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
144. Billman, 915 F.2d at 921; see United States v. Skiles, 715 F. Supp. 1567, 1568 (N.D.Ga. 1989)
(reading the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 853 to permit the pretrial restraint of substitute assets).
145. Billnan, 915 F.2d at 921; see Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 922, 947 (1970) (providing that the provisions of RICO are to be liberally construed to effectuate RICO's
remedial purpose); see also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983) (emphasizing that the forfeiture
provisions of RICO should be construed liberally to achieve their remedial purpose).
146. Billman, 915 F.2d at 921.
147. Id.
148. 491 U.S. 600(1989).
149. See Billinan, 915 F.2d at 921 (stating that the Supreme Court's harmonizing of provisions of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act confirms the Court of Appeals' reading of the RICO forfeiture and asset
restraint provisions in conjunction with each other).
150. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 612 (1989) (analyzing whether assets traceable to
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act violations are subject to pretrial restraint when such assets are in the
possession of a third party).
151. See Billinan, 915 F.2d at 921 (drawing justification from Monsanto for its reading of RICO's
substitute asset forfeiture provision with its pretrial restraint provision); Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 612 (construing
the third party transfer and pretrial restraint provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act to permit the
restraint of assets in possession of a third party).
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The decisions of United States v. Regan 52 and In re Assets of Billman
authorize pretrial restraint of substitute assets.153 Both of these appellate decisions
rely on a harmonized reading of RICO's substitute asset forfeiture provisions with
that Act's pretrial restraint provisions.' m The Courts of Appeals in other circuits,
however, have not been willing to construe RICO or the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Act in the same fashion. 55
B. Pretrial Restraint of Substitute Assets Prohibited
The Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have not been willing
to restrain substitute assets prior to trial under RICO or the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Act.'- Each of these federal appellate courts have held that substitute asset
restraint was outside the scope of the statutes' language and Congress' intent in
enacting their provisions. 157 The following decisions directly contradict the
decisions of the Second and Fourth Circuits discussed above.
1. United States v. Floyd'
58
In United States v. Floyd, the Fifth Circuit reached the issue of whether
substitute assets may be restrained prior to trial under the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Act. 59 The defendant, a former president and chief executive officer of
United Bank, was indicted on charges relating to his fraudulent disposal of $1.96
152. 858 F.2d 115, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1988).
153. See supra notes 109-154 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Regan and In re Assets
of Billman).
154. Id.
155. See infra notes 156-207 and accompanying text (discussing cases refusing to read the forfeiture and
pretrial restraint provisions of RICO or the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act to permit pretrial restraint of
substitute assets).
156. United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 365 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Assets of Martin, I F.3d 1351,
1362 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498, 502 (5th Cir. 1993); see infra notes 158-177 and
accompanying text (describing the Fifth Circuit's refusal to authorize pretrial substitute asset restraint under
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act in United States v. Floyd); infra notes 178-207 and accompanying text
(describing the Third Circuit's recent decision in In re Assets of Martin, which refused to authorize pretrial
substitute asset restraint pursuant to RICO); infra notes 189-207 and accompanying text (describing the Ninth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Ripinsky, holding that substitute assets may not be restrained prior to trial
under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act).
157. See infra notes 170-174 and accompanying text (describing the Fifth Circuit's findings in United
States v. Floyd that substitute asset restraint was outside the scope of the language of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Act and contrary to congressional intent); infra notes 183-188 and accompanying text (describing the
Third Circuit's findings in Ripinsky that pretrial restraint of substitute assets was outside the scope of RICO's
language and contrary to congressional intent); infra notes 196-204 and accompanying text (discussing the
Ninth Circuit's ruling in In re Assets of Martin that pretrial restraint of substitute assets exceeded the scope of
the statutory language and was contrary to congressional intent under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act).
158. 992 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1993).
159. Floyd, 992 F.2d at 500.
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million of the bank's assets.' 6° The Government sought an ex parte restraining
order pursuant to the general forfeiture provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 982 to restrain
specified assets and requested a general restraint of Floyd's right to dispose of
other assets.'6' After obtaining the order to restrain assets totaling $401,719, the
Government sought a protective order restraining Floyd from disposing of
substitute assets up to the $1.96 million amount he had allegedly obtained from
his crimes, since he no longer was in possession of the money he had allegedly
derived from his crimes. 62
The United States Court for the Northern District of Texas granted the
Government's motion to restrain the substitute assets, but limited the amount to
$450,000 because the Government had not persuaded the court that the amount
it sought to restrain would be forfeitable upon conviction.163 The district court,
relying on the reasoning of In re Assets of Billman,t" determined that the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act permitted pretrial restraint of substitute assets.165
The district court thus denied Floyd's request that he be allowed to use the
restrained funds for living expenses and attorney's fees. 166 On appeal, the
Government argued that section 853(e)(1)(A) authorized pretrial restraint of
substitute assets, based on the reasoning of In re Assets of Billman.'67 The Floyd
court, however, was not persuaded by the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, even though
the Billman court had interpreted language in the RICO statute that was in
essence identical to the provisions of section 853 involved in this case.'6
In reversing the decision of the district court, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that section 853(e)(1)(A) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Act does not allow the pretrial restraint of substitute assets.' 69 The Floyd court
160. Id. at 499; see Tracy Everbach, Former Developer Indicted; Bank Fraud Case 'Vindictive,' He
Says, DAL.As MORNING NEws, Dec. 18, 1992, at 29A (reporting the indictments of Floyd and Thomas Merrill
Gaubert, Floyd's alleged co-conspirator, and quoting Gaubert as saying that he had been a target of vindictive
prosecutors because of his 1988 acquittal on other charges).
161. Floyd, 992 F.2d at 499; see 18 U.S.C. § 982 (Supp. II 1991) (providing for criminal forfeiture in
general); see also supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 982 and its incorporation
of the criminal forfeiture and pretrial restraint provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act); supra notes
99-101 and accompanying text (describing the circumstances and requirements for issuance of an ex parte
restraining order pursuant to RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act).
162. Floyd, 992 F.2d at 499.
163. Id.
164. 915 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1990).
165. Floyd, 992 F.2d at 499; see supra notes 142-155 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning
of In re Assets of Billman).
166. Floyd, 992 F.2d at 501; see infra notes 234-241 and accompanying text (discussing the implications
of pretrial restraint of substitute assets on the right to assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
of the Constitution).
167. Floyd, 992 F.2d at 501; see supra notes 142-155 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning
of In re Assets of Billman).
168. See Floyd, 992 F.2d at 501 (acknowledging that the RICO forfeiture provisions were essentially
identical to the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 853 involved in this case); Floyd, 992 F.2d at 502 (indicating that
the court was not persuaded by the reasoning of Billman to support restraint of property); supra notes 142-155
and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning in In re Assets of Bilhinan).
169. Floyd, 992 F.2d at 502.
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emphasized that the language of the pretrial restraint provision in section 853(e)
refers only to property described in section 853(a) as crime-related property.' 0
While acknowledging that section 853, like the RICO statute, directs that its
provisions be liberally construed to fulfill its remedial purposes, 7' the court stated
that even such a requirement of liberal interpretation does not authorize what the
court viewed as amendment by interpretation.1
72
The court in Floyd criticized the Fourth Circuit's reliance on United States
v. Monsanto. 73 According to the Floyd court, Monsanto had cautioned against
finding an exception to the express language of the Act where no such exception
had been provided by Congress. 7" Further, the Floyd court believed the Supreme
Court's reading of the pretrial restraint provisions of the Act to be consistent with
its own interpretation. 75 The court emphasized its strong aversion to allowing
pretrial restraint of substitute assets, elaborating that such restraints are
reminiscent of writs of assistance 76 and pose Fourth Amendment concerns, since
they would allow the Government to seize property that is neither evidence nor
the fruit of a crime.'"
170. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988) (authorizing forfeiture of property derived from or used in the
commission of a criminal violation); id. § 853(e)(l)(A) (1988) (authorizing the pretrial restraint of assets
described in § 853(a)).
171. 21 U.S.C. § 853(o) (1988); Floyd, 992 F.2d at 502.
172. Floyd, 992 F.2d at 502.
173. Id.; see Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 600, 612 (1989) (construing the third party transfer and pretrial
restraint provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act to permit the restraint of assets in possession of a
third party).
174. See Floyd, 992 F.2d at 502 (emphasizing that the Monsanto decision cautioned against reading
language into the Act that Congress had not included); see also Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 612 (refusing to read
language into 21 U.S.C. § 853 that would protect assets from restraint to allow for payment of attorney's fees,
in the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent).
175. See Floyd, 992 F.2d at 502 n.7 (quoting the Monsanto Court as stating that the pretrial restraint
provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 853 are clearly aimed at implementing the requirements of the crime-related asset
forfeiture provision). The district court is authorized by 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) to enter an order restraining
assets to preserve the availability of property listed in in 21 U.S.C. § 853(a). 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(l)(A); see
21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988) (authorizing the forfeiture of property derived from or used in the commission of
a criminal violation).
176. See Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future
of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLuM. L. REV. 1365, 1369-70 (1983) (explaining
that writs of assistance were a powerful tool used during colonial times to search for goods that had been
smuggled in order to avoid taxes, and that they allowed agents of the Crown to search for such goods without
discretion).
177. Floyd, 992 F.2d at 502; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV (guaranteeing the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures); Stewart, supra note 176, at 1369-70 (stating that the Fourth Amendment
was adopted primarily to ensure that citizens' liberty would no longer be threatened by general warrants and
writs of assistance); see also infra notes 226-233 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Amendment
implications of pretrial substitute asset restraint).
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2. In re Assets of Martin
78
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in In re Assets of Martin that RICO
does not authorize pretrial restraint of substitute assets. 79 The defendants in
Martin allegedly violated RICO through schemes to avoid excise taxes in the
heating oil business. 8 ' The Government obtained pre-indictment temporary
restraining orders under the restraint provisions of RICO, which included the
restraint of substitute assets.'8 ' In denying the order, the court, like the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Floyd,82 relied on a plain reading of the statute.'83 The
Martin court disagreed with the Billman'8 and Regan'5 decisions for looking to
the purpose of the statute, when, according to the court, the statute's meaning is
clear on its face."8 Nevertheless, the court concluded that it was compelled to
look to legislative history, because its ruling would stand in conflict with the
Billman and Regan decisions."8 In discussing the statute's legislative history, the
court cited language that, in the court's view, clearly established that Congress
had intended that substitute assets should not be restrained under RICO prior to
trial. 88
3. United States v. Ripinsky t8 9
In perhaps the strongest pronouncement against pretrial restraint of substitute
assets to date, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed a district court
decision authorizing such restraint in United States v. Ripinsky.'9g As with Floyd,
Ripinsky involved an appeal of a lower court decision authorizing pretrial restraint
178. 1 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1993).
179. Id. at 1362.
180. Id. at 1353; see Jobber Sting Crushes Huge Russian Mafia Tax Scam, U.S. OIL WEEK, May 30.
1994 (reporting that the conspirators in the tax schemes had sold untaxed heating oil as diesel fuel at eight cents
per gallon below market price, and that some salespeople involved had earned more than $500,000 within
approximately one year).
181. Martin, I F.3d at 1354; see id. at 1354 n.2 (describing the indictment in the case as a "formidable
document" that included 89 counts and was 169 pages in length).
182. 992 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1993).
183. Martin, I F.3d at 1358.
184. In re Assets of Billman, 915 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1990).
185. United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1988).
186. Martin, I F.3d at 1359.
187. Id.; see supra notes 109-155 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions in Regan and
Billman, which authorized pretrial restraint of substitute assets).
188. Martin, I F.3d at 1359. The legislative history on which the court relied emerged in the context of
proposed amendments to RICO in 1982. Although these amendments were not enacted that year. their
substantive content was adopted with the amendments to RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act in
1986). Rakoff, supra note 63, at 3; see S. REP. 97-520, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (1982) (commenting on the
amendments to RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act that were proposed in 1982, and noting that
the restraining order provisions applied only to subsection(a) property, and may not be applied to other assets).
189. 20 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1994).
190. Id. at 365.
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of assets, which had no connection to the defendant's alleged crimes under the
provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 853 as incorporated into the General Criminal
Forfeiture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 982.191
In Ripinsky, the defendant, Juri Ripinsky was indicted for violations of
conspiracy, bank fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and forfeiture statutes
involving approximately $2.3 million."9 On the day the indictment was issued,
the Government obtained a restraining order freezing Ripinsky's assets totalling
$1,745,500, which were held by the defendant in England.' 93 Although the assets
would have been forfeitable if Ripinsky were convicted, the Government
conceded that the assets were not in any way connected to the charges against
him."s4 Through a series of motions, the Government converted the temporary
restraining order into a preliminary injunction over Ripinsky's objections, and
then modified the preliminary injunction, with the final effect being a total
restraint of $1,017,500-none of which was connected to Ripinsky's alleged
crimes.' 9
The Ripinsky court agreed with the decisions of the Third and Fifth Circuits
that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 853 did not authorize the pretrial
restraint."9 In response to the Government's argument that the statute's mandate
for liberal construction to further its remedial purpose prohibited such a focused
reading, the court agreed with Floyd that it does not authorize amendment "by
interpretation."' 97 In addition, the Ripinsky court addressed the Government's
argument that the latter's interpretation of the statute would be required to achieve
the remedial purpose of the forfeiture provisions. 98 The court responded by
pointing out the Supreme Court's recent recognition in Alexander v. United
States'99 and Austin v. United States,200 that the criminal forfeiture provisions of
RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act are not strictly remedial, but also
punitive.
191. Id. at 360.
192. Id.; see Enforcement, 60 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 682 (May 10, 1993) (reporting that
Ripinsky and his alleged co-conspirators had been partners in several real estate development companies based
in Los Angeles, and that they were alleged to have diverted over $2 million from real estate joint ventures),
193. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d at 365.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 360-61 (detailing the process by which the Government obtained restraints for $272,500
and $745,000 through a series of motions).
196. Id. at 363.
197. Id.; see Floyd, 992 F.2d at 502 (refusing to read 21 U.S.C. § 853 to permit restraint of substitute
assets because such a reading would require the court to "amend by interpretation").
198. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d at 363.
199. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
200. Id. at 2801.
201. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d at 363 n.5; see Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2775-76 (characterizing 18 U.S.C. § 1963
as a form of monetary punishment); Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 (1993) (stating that 21
U.S.C. § 853 "can only be explained as serving in part to punish").
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To support its decision, the Ripinsky court turned to legislative history to
discern congressional intent." 2 The court found that Congress, in a 1983 Senate
report discussing subsection (p) (the substitute asset provision of section 853),
had described it as "a provision authorizing the court to order the defendant to
forfeit substitute assets when his property originally subject to forfeiture had been
made unavailable at the time of conviction. '203 The court emphasized that a
Senate report from 1982 had analyzed a provision nearly identical to subsection
(e) (the restraining order provisions of section 853), stating that the restraining
order provisions applied only to crime-related assets and could not be applied to
other assets that might eventually be forfeitable under the substitute asset
provision.2m
Finally and most significantly, the Ripinsky court asserted that if it granted
the Government's wish, it would expand the Government's extensive powers by
handing the Government a more powerful weapon which could be used against
the accused, who, as the court emphasized, is to be presumed innocent.2 5
Furthermore, in response to the Government's argument that pretrial restraint of
substitute assets would only preserve the status quo, such restraint could have "far
reaching effects," according to the court. Giving the government such a powerful
tool, the court emphasized, would enable it essentially to reach all of the assets
of an individual or a business, a phenomenon that could "cripple a business and
destroy an individual's livelihood."2°0 In conclusion, the court expressly refused
to allow such a severe remedy to assets that are not related to the crime, where a
person is merely accused and is entitled to a presumption of innocence. °
III. FUTURE OUTLOOK
While the forfeiture provisions of RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Act serve as important tools in fighting crime, forfeiture has significant potential
for unchecked use by the Government, without regard to the individual rights of
the defendant.208 In personam forfeiture, authorized by RICO and the Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Act, is really a form of punishment, rather than strictly a
confiscation of property based on illegal use. . While pretrial restraint may be
202. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d at 363-64.
203. Id. at 364; S. Rep. 98-225, Pub. L. 98-473, 98th Cong., 2d Sess, 198, 213, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3381, 3396 (1984).
204. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d at 364; S. REP. 97-520,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 14, 17(1982).
205. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d at 365.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Rakoff, supra note 63, at 3 (observing that forfeiture has potential for governmental abuse, if
not checked by Congress or the courts).
209. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2778 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see Bilhnan, 915 F.2d at 920 (noting
that criminal forfeiture under RICO is an in personain proceeding against the defendant, and that such
forfeiture is a punishment against the defendant); supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (discussing the
characteristics and use of in personam forfeiture).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 26
necessary sometimes to preserve the availability of property tainted by the
commission of a crime, such restraint of substitute assets is not authorized by the
plain language of RICO or the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act, and apparently
was not intended by Congress."' Furthermore, as suggested by the court in Floyd,
granting the Government power to seize property that is neither evidence nor the
fruit of a crime may violate the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure pro-
vision.2t' Finally, the Constitutional right assuring a criminal defendant of the
right to counsel of choice poses serious concerns that should prohibit the pretrial
restraint of substitute assets.
212
A. Statutory Language and Congressional Intent with Regard to Pretrial
Restraint of Substitute Assets
The United States Supreme Court has stated with regard to RICO that if its
statutory language is unambiguous, and Congress has not clearly expressed intent
to the contrary, that language must normally be regarded as conclusive.2 3 Only
if statutory language is unclear may the court look to legislative history.' 4 The
language of RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act seems to disallow
restraint of substitute assets prior to conviction. The pretrial restraint section of
RICO, as set out in 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d), expressly limits its application to
ensuring the availability of property described in section 1963(a), which covers
only forfeiture of assets related to the crime.2' 5 The pretrial restraint section of
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act, 21 U.S.C. § 853(e), similarly restricts its
reach to property described in section 853(a), which, like RICO, covers only
forfeiture of assets related to the crime.216 The provisions allowing for forfeiture
of substitute assets upon conviction are described in wholly separate subsections
of each Act.2t 7 These provisions expressly authorize only the forfeiture of assets
unrelated to the crime and do not make any reference to pretrial restraint.218
210. See infra notes 213-224 and accompanying text (discussing why pretrial restraint of substitute assets
is not authorized by the language of RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act's forfeiture and pretrial
restraint provisions and is contrary to congressional intent).
211. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498 at 502; see U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (protecting the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures); infra notes 226-233 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth
Amendment implications of pretrial restraint of substitute assets).
212. See infra notes 234-241 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment).
213. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,20 (1983).
214. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984).
215. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988 & Supp. 111991); id. § 1963(d) (1988).
216. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988); id. § 853(e) (1988).
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988) (authorizing forfeiture of substitute assets under RICO upon
conviction); 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (1988) (authorizing forfeiture of substitute assets under the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Act upon conviction).
218. See id. § 1963(m) (1988) (authorizing forfeiture of substitute assets under RICO upon conviction,
but making no mention of pretrial restraint); 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (1988) (authorizing forfeiture of substitute
assets under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act upon conviction, but making no mention of pretrial restraint),
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Although the language. of the pretrial restraint and substitute asset forfeiture
provisions seems abundantly clear, 'ome courts have deemed it sufficiently
ambiguous to justify inquiring into congressional intent.2?19 In attempting to
discern the intent of Congress, courts have looked to statutory language and to
legislative history.
The internal statutory language that arguably conveys a congressional intent
to allow pretrial substitute asset restraint is found in section 904(a) of Pub. L. 91-
452 (containing the statutes enacting RICO). That section provides that the
provisions of Title 18, including RICO, are to be liberally construed to effectuate
the remedial purpose of Title 18.m The Billman court relied on that language in
supporting its decision to read the pretrial restraint provisions together with the
substitute asset forfeiture provisions, in order to restrain substitute assets before
trial.221 Such a reading, however, has two significant flaws. First, it requires an
assumption (made by the Billman court) that the remedial purpose of RICO
includes the specific purpose of preserving any asset that may later be subject to
forfeiture, despite language within the statute clearly defining its aim as the
preservation of crime-related property. 22 Second, the Billman court's reading
assumes that the concept represented by the term "liberal construction" permits
a court to read into the Acts language that does not exist and that clearly could
have been included by Congress.
Although the 1986 amendments to RICO are devoid of legislative history on
the congressional intent concerning pretrial restraint of substitute assets, an
express intent not to restrain substitute assets can be found in a Senate report
accompanying a 1982 proposal aimed at amending RICO to permit. post-
conviction forfeiture of substitute assets, but not to permit the pre-conviction
seizure of such assets.m Although the amendments proposed in 1982 were not
passed at the time, they were included without substantial change in amendments
made to RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act in 1986, which added the
219. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Circuit's inquiry into
congressional intent in In re Assets of Biiman); supra notes 172-174 and accompanying text (discussing the
Fifth Circuit's inquiry into congressional intent in United States v. Floyd); supra notes 187-188 and
accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit's inquiry into congressional intent in In re Assets of Martin);
supra notes 202-204 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit's inquiry into congressional intent
in United States v. Ripinsky).
220. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970).
221. See Billman, 915 F.2d at 921 (maintaining that liberal construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1963 requires
reading the substitute asset provision together with the pretrial restraint provision).
222. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1) (1988), 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (1988) (authorizing the court to issue a
restraining order or take other action to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) of both
statutes); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988 & Supp. 1 1991), 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988) (authorizing
forfeiture of property derived from or involved in the commission of the crime).
223. See S. REP. 97-520, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 10, 14, 17 (1982) (stating that the restraining order
provisions applied only to crime-related assets and could not be applied to other assets that might eventually
be forfeitable under the substitute asset provisions).
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substitute asset provisions.224 Therefore, the intent set forth in the 1982 report can
be deemed applicable to the congressional enactments in 1986.
B. Constitutional Concerns with Allowing Pretrial Restraint of Substitute
Assets
In personam forfeiture is primarily punitive in nature. If RICO and the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act are construed to authorize pretrial restraint of
substitute assets, significant constitutional concerns are raised regarding the right
to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment and the right
to assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
1. Fourth Amendment Concerns
Even if Congress had intended to allow pretrial restraint of substitute assets,
such a practice may violate the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment's
protection from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. The Supreme
Court has defined the seizure of property as a meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interests in that property.m Post-conviction forfeiture of
substitute assets, a seizure within the Supreme Court's definition, may be
considered reasonable and therefore not violative of the Fourth Amendment, since
it is authorized by RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act only to the
extent necessary to satisfy a judgment for forfeiture in the amount of the tainted
assets. 7 The same cannot always be said when the seizure precedes trial, and
property is restrained pending an order of forfeiture.
While it may be reasonable under some circumstances for the Government
to seize crime-related assets prior to trial, the seizure of wholly untainted assets
prior to a judgment ordering forfeiture and a finding that the crime-related assets
are unavailable is unreasonable. 28 As the Ninth Circuit recognized in United
States v. Ripinsky, pretrial restraint of untainted assets is potentially crippling to
224. Rakoff, supra note 63, at 3.
225. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (guaranteeing the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures); id amend. VI (guaranteeing a criminal defendant the right to assistance of counsel); infra notes 226-
233 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Amendment implications of pretrial substitute asset restraint);
infra notes 234-241 and accompanying text (discussing Sixth Amendment implications of pretrial substitute
asset restraint).
226. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
227. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988) (authorizing the forfeiture of substitute assets under RICO upon
conviction where tainted assets are unavailable); 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (1988) (authorizing the forfeiture of
substitute assets under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act upon conviction, where tainted assets are
unavailable).
228. See Floyd, 992 F.2d at 502 (finding that the pretrial restraint of substitute assets "posed sufficient
Fourth Amendment concerns" to prohibit reading the provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act to
permit such restraint); Jay Wishingrad, RICO v. The Bill of Rights, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 15, 1990, at 2 (asserting that
RICO raises Fourth Amendment concerns because it permits the seizure of assets prior to trial).
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a criminal defendant.229 The severe practice of substitute asset restraint could
affect the criminal defendant's ability to pay for his legal defense, obtain personal
sustenance, and continue his legitimate business activities ° Furthermore,
extended restraint of a defendant's assets can cause permanent financial loss
through depreciating values and lost market opportunities.'
Beyond crippling the criminal defendant, such restraint can adversely affect
important rights of third parties as well. For example, a defendant's legitimate
financial interests in a business association such as a partnership might be
restrained as substitute assets, thereby inhibiting the activities of a business
connected in absolutely no way with the crime. 2 Third parties are potentially
vulnerable in two ways with regard to restraint of substitute assets. First, where
substitute assets are involved, it is likely that the third party sharing an interest
with the defendant in a particular asset will not know of the risk of forfeiture,
since the defendant's tainted assets maybe involved in a wholly separate
enterprise. Second, in the event that the third party is affected by restraint of the
defendant's interest in the shared asset, the third party lacks standing to address
the defendant's guilt or innocence, upon which the restraint and ultimate
forfeiture will be based. 3
2. Sixth Amendment Concerns
Pretrial restraint of substitute assets raises concerns over the defendant's right
to counsel under the Sixth Amendmentm While the Supreme Court has
addressed the Sixth Amendment impact of pretrial restraint of crime-related assets
under the criminal forfeiture provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act,
it has not addressed the issue of pretrial restraint of substitute assets under either
Act.
229. Ripins=, 20 F.3d at 365.
230. See Floyd, 992 F.2d at 500-01 (recounting the district court's denial of the defendant's request that
he be allowed to use certain assets for living expenses and attorney's fees after the court had determined that
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act authorized pretrial restraint of the defendant's substitute assets); Adler,
supra note 10, at Al (reporting that four months after its officials were indicted, the Princeton/Newport Group
(discussed in notes 111-117 and accompanying text, supra) was liquidated because RICO had driven the Group
out of business); Jane Rohrer, Note, What Price Investor Confidence? RICO Abuse as Compensable Takings,
66 S. CAL. L.REV. 1675, 1677 (1993).
231. Terrance G. Reed & Joseph P. Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable 'Interests, 'and Procedural Due
Process, 62 N.C. L. REv., 57, 72 (1983).
232. See Bush, supra note 37, at 1000 (criticizing the forfeiture and pretrial restraint provisions or RICO
for their potential to adversely affect legitimate business); see also Skorcz, supra note 81, at 1205-12
(discussing the dangers posed by in personam forfeiture to third parties who have made loans to defendants
with property subject to forfeiture pursuant to RICO or the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act).
233. Reed & Gill, supra note 231, at 72.
234. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing criminal defendants the right to assistance of counsel).
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In Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,235 and United States v.
Monsanto,2 6 the Supreme Court held that pretrial restraint of crime-related assets
pursuant to section 853 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act does not violate
a criminal defendant's right to assistance of counsel or choice.27 Specifically, in
holding that the defendant in Caplin & Drysdale had no Sixth Amendment right
to use property acquired as a result of drug violations to pay for his legal defense,
the Court acknowledged that the Government's power to prevent a defendant
from using assets to pay for an attorney has its limits. In the words of the Court:
"Whatever the full extent of the Sixth Amendment's protection of one's right to
retain counsel of his choosing, that protection does not go beyond the individual's
right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance of...
counsel.' '23'
An important distinction should be made between the factual situations under
which Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto were decided and the facts in a case
where substitute assets are restrained. The Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto
decisions were rendered in the context of pretrial restraint of assets allegedly tied
to Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act violations.2 9 In each case, assets could be
identified as connected to the alleged crimes. In such scenarios, restraint of the
crime-related assets does not adversely affect the defendant's right to counsel,
according to the Court, because the defendant has no right to illegally acquired
assets.240 In the case of assets unrelated to the crime, however, the property is the
defendant's own and should not be taken away or restrained in any way, absent
a judgment that the defendant is guilty and a determination that crime-related
assets are no longer available. Restraint of such assets clearly crosses the line
recognized by the Supreme Court, protecting the "individual's right to spend his
own money to obtain the advice and assistance of... counsel.
24
CONCLUSION
Currently, criminal defendants prosecuted under either RICO or the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act receive inconsistent treatment so far as pretrial
235. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
236. 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
237. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 614 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 491 U.S. 617, 631-33 (1989); see also supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's harmonized reading of Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act Provisions to allow the restraint of
crime-related assets in the hands of a third party).
238. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626 (emphasis added); see Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 370 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that a defendant has the right to use
his own funds to obtain the advice and assistance of counsel).
239. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619-20, Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 602-03 (characterizing the assets
in question as allegedly subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a), the section of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Act authorizing forfeiture of crime-related assets).
240. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 626-28.
241. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626 (emphasis added).
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restraint of substitute assets is concerned. Defendants in one jurisdiction may rest
assured that their untainted assets are safe from restraint, while defendants in
another jurisdiction are denied access to substitute assets.
Absent a Supreme Court decision resolving the conflict over pretrial restraint
of substitute assets or a congressional amendment to the pretrial restraint
provisions under RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act, defendants in
jurisdictions allowing pretrial substitute asset restraint will continue to suffer
deprivation of constitutional rights to the use of legitimate property.


